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literally, something for everyone. The student is given an interesting and fully
explained approach to the subject, with good direction for study in depth. The
teacher is given a well organized, well documented text to teach from. And the work
would be a worthwhile addition to the library of a practitioner who may need a
short, lucid answer to one of the myriad questions which arise periodically covering
a point which we knew well but have forgotten.
RAYMOND S. WEISLER*

* Certified Public Accountant of the State of Illinois. Member of the Illinois Bar. J.D.
John Marshall Law School. Assistant Professor, Commerce Department, Lewis College,
Lockport, Illinois.

Property Law Indicted! By W. BARTON LEACH. Lawrence, Kansas: University of
Kansas Press, 1967. Pp. 94. $2.25.
The brevity of this virtual transcript of Professor Leach's 1966 Stephens Lectures at the University of Kansas School of Law is deceptive, because within this
volume the author touches upon broad questions of policy, such as prospective
over-rule, the judicial reconstruction of estates and trusts and the protection of
wives and descendants from disinheritance, while at the same time he is dealing
with or mentioning in passing a wide range of other property law matters such as
the extension of cy pres, the rule in Shelley's Case, the Doctrine of Worthier
Title, inheritance by adopted children, anti-lapse legislation, powers of appointment, the preference for vested over contingent remainders, death without issue,
the distinction set forth in Clobberie's Case, conveyancing reform, and the rule
against perpetuities.
Since, however, Professor Leach's views on the above topics are well known to
the academic lawyer and since the treatment of most items is very short and uneven in any case, this slim volume will be of most value to the well-read practicing
attorney who has a difficult case and who needs some bold and authoritative language to hand to a trial judge, or to quote in an appellate brief, to induce a court
to do a little innovating, preferably in the area of property law.'
Professor Leach, of course, favors innovation by judges and legislators, prodded
onward by law professors and practicing lawyers. 2 He recognizes that a practicing
1 There are abundant quotations by Professor Leach from non-Leach sources, as well
as a good supply of his own pungent comments. For instance: "[T]he Doctrine of
Worthier Title, the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders, and the Rule
in Shelley's Case" are "abominations." LEAcn, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED I 9 (1967). The

cases dealing with the so-called rules of construction present "a nauseating collection of
judicial garbage." Id. at 60.
2"My purpose in these hours is to put what I consider proper emphasis on the
obligation of the legal profession to reform the law, by both judicial and legislative
action, where existing rules are unjust." Id. at 3. "My purpose is to be sure that our
state courts in private law cases realize that the shackles have fallen away-that where
they find that (a) existing decisions are bad law and (b) retroactive application would
cause injustice, they are free to overrule the bad law and eliminate the injustice of
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lawyer cannot very often try to make new and better law at the expense of his
client, but he rightly indicates that courts today are more receptive to change than
heretofore and that a lawyer may
now be in a better position to risk taking a case
3
on appeal, than in times past.
It is, on the other hand, certainly questionable whether or not Professor Leach
goes too far in wanting to give judges the broad authority "to reform wills and
trusts which are outrageous in their neglect of proper concern and provision for
the natural objects of bounty of the testator or creator of the trust," 4 even though
the good professor lists his solid qualifications for making such a "radical" proposal.5
It is at this point, when Professor Leach discusses the authority of the judge, or
the authority a judge ought to exercise, that he touches on the dilemma involved in
maintaining a system of law which is orderly, yet still capable of adjusting swiftly
to new conditions. Shall we give judges broad authority to decide each case without
being bound by precedent, or shall we have constant legislative reform? Professor
Leach does not give his judgment on these questions; he merely raises them.
All lawyers know, along with Professor Leach, that judges make law. Sometimes
the judge-made change is dramatic, but usually the change is rather slow and often
frustrating to behold. Hence periodic reminders that many of the rules which we
now hold as settled were the result of judge-made innovation in the past is wholesome for all of us. 6
On the other hand, we also know that legislatures are often slow to act, and most
lawyers realize that to pass a statute is not always to guarantee immediate passage
from confusion to clarity. So the dilemma of maintaining order and change, law
and justice, remains, since as a practical matter neither the court system nor the
legislature can really provide a solution to the problem.
Perhaps the best way out of the situation would be to have judges who are committed to the rule of law and to an objective standard of justice but who nevertheless understand that individual cases must be decided on the basis of their
unique facts and social setting, sometimes in spite of seemingly binding precedents. 7
retroactive application." Id. at 19. Professor Leach is here talking about prospective
overrule. For a good discussion of this point, see Professor Shaffer's book review of
Leach, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 140 (1967).

3 "Don't lie down and roll over because there is a precedent, or even a line of precedents, against you. I really believe that our present courts are in the Age of the Rationalists, the Innovators, and the Trail Blazers." LEACH, supra note 1, 89-90.
4 LEACH, supra note 1, 31.

I "I have been a registered Republican since 1921, when I first obtained the right to
vote, and-the acid test-I voted for the candidate from the Sunflower State in 1936." Id.
at 31. Professor Shaffer in his review retorted: "That test was obviously a courtesy for

the benefit of his hosts in Lawrence. Everyone knows when the acid test for Republicans
was-in 1964-but he doesn't say a word about that year." 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 140

(1967).
6 Thus Chief Justice Vanderbilt in his dissent in Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877
(1950), notes that without judicial change and overrulling of prior decisions, "There
would have been, e.g., no rule against perpetuities, no restraints on the alienation of
property, no right to redeem mortgaged premises, no foreclosure of the equity of redemp-

tion, and so on endlessly." Quoted by LEACH, supra note 1, at 26.
7 Dean Levi has described the process in his 1948 book, AN INTRODUCTION To LEOAL
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At any rate Professor Leach's sprightly little vade mecum for the property law
reformer is stimulating reading and a good source for vigorous quotations.
IRVING E.

FASAN*

REAsoNiNc. Professor Shaffer says that, "[This] middle ground is sometimes devious and
often capable of an ancient and esoteric sophistry, but it produces change, it maintains
stability better than overt overruling would, and it is, for all its righteous dishonesty,
useful." 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 146 (1967). Is this also what Professor Leach really advocates, however without the deviousness and sophistry? But without these cloaks, do
we really have the same thing? Isn't the fiction a vital part of the process?
* Assistant Professor at DePaul University College of Law, Member of the Illinois
Bar. J.D., University of Chicago, formerly in practice in Chicago, 1957-1966.

Six Seconds in Dallas. By JosIAH THOMPSON. New York: Bernard Geis, 1967.
Pp. 314. $8.95.
The publication Six Seconds in Dallas by Josiah Thompson, an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Haverford College, in which he concludes that there were
four shots from three guns in six seconds. This again raises a familiar issue to
students of the Kennedy assassination-how does one account for the forward
movement of President Kennedy's body in frame 313 of the Zapruder film and the
apparent violent backward movement of his body in frame 314? Writers had raised
this problem as early as 1965, but Thompson's distinctive contribution was to
analyze the photographs by means of micro-analysis and measurement, thereby
achieving a scientific reconstruction in order to answer the problems of the source
and timing of the shots.
One of the difficulties in studying the Zapruder film as it appears in the Warren
Commission Exhibits is that the originals are in the private vault of Life magazine
(which purchased them for $25,000 within several hours of the assassination) and
the Commission only had available to them a copy of a copy. Fortunately Professor Thompson, while in the employ of Life magazine, had the opportunity to examine sharper material. Mr. Zapruder's film picks up the presidential motorcade
at what is known as frame 161, and continues until the motorcade disappears under
the underpass at frame 434. No one has ever disputed the conclusion that the
fatal second wound occurs in frame 313, although many commentators argue about
the occurrence of the first shot-the Warren Commission placing it between frame
210 to 225. To Thompson, the Zapruder film in its entirety is the most important
piece of evidence available to the Commission. Ironically, Mr. Zapruder had earlier
in the day decided not to bring his eight millimeter movie camera to work because
of an overcast sky condition, he somehow managed to return to his home when the
overcast lifted at midmorning, and arrived at his office near Dealey Plaza just in
time to film the historic event.
In addition to the Zapruder film, there were no fewer than 22 other people taking
pictures in Dealey Plaza which were known to and available to the Commission.
It is primarily to this type of evidence that Thompson structures his analysis, as he
states: "[T]he present study seeks to make proper use of the photographs inasmuch as they constitute the only inviolable form of evidence. Whereas witness

